What Future for the European Union? An Economic Debate and Perspective by Quaisser, Wolfgang & Wegner, Manfred
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What Future for the European Union? 
An Economic Debate and Perspective 
WOLFGANG QUAISSER 
MANFRED WEGNER 
forost Arbeitspapier Nr. 43 
Februar 2008 
    
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Forschungsverbund Ost- und Südosteuropa (forost) 
Redaktion: Helga Schubert 
ISBN  978-3-9810703-7-8 
ISSN  1613-0332 
forost wird gefördert vom 
Bayerischen Staatsministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst 
© forost, München 
Abdruck oder vergleichbare Verwendung von Arbeiten des Forschungsver-
bunds Ost- und Südosteuropa ist auch in Auszügen nur mit vorheriger 
schriftlicher Genehmigung der Geschäftsstelle gestattet. 
 
3
Vorwort 
Viele der aktuellen Diskussionen zur Osterweiterung, zum Schengen-Abkom-
men, zur Aufnahme weiterer Mitglieder in die jetzt 27 Länder umfassende 
Europäische Union, und vor allem zum Verfassungsvertrag, sind die Fragen 
der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in letzter Zeit eher in den Hintergrund getre-
ten. Der Gemeinsame Markt, die Gemeinsame Währung, das sind inzwischen 
Selbstverständlichkeiten, die meist nur unter konjunkturellen Gesichtspunk-
ten diskutiert werden. Dabei ist die wirtschaftliche Integration eine beachtli-
che Erfolgsgeschichte, die maßgeblich die politische Integration gefördert hat. 
Bei jedem komplexen System ist es verführerisch, einzelne Komponenten zu 
analysieren und deren Interdependenz darüber zu vernachlässigen. Die Auf-
gabe der Europäischen Integration findet im sozialen und politischen, im men-
talen und auch im individuellen Bereich statt und ist zudem von unterschied-
lichen nationalen Kulturen und Perpektiven geprägt. Im wirtschaftlichen und 
sozialen Bereich steht die EU nach der Osterweiterung vor der Aufgabe, sehr 
unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftsräumen zu integrieren und gleichzeitig den wie-
teren Integrationsprozess fortzuführen. Nicht immer gelingt dies und eine 
gewisse Europamüdigkeit ist festellbar.   
Wolfgang Quaisser und Manfred Wegner sind den komplexen Bezügen auf den 
Grund gegangen und versuchen in diesem Bändchen auf leicht verständliche 
Weise diffizile Zusammenhänge aufzuzeigen.  
In Ergänzung zu den letzten forost-Heften, in denen der Begriff der "Europäi-
sierung" beleuchtet, euroskeptische Überlegungen aufgezeigt wurden, und 
immer wieder die Problematik der Integration analysiert wurde, finden Sie im 
vorliegenden Band eine vergleichende Zusammenschau der Erfolgsstory Euro-
pa, der Gefahren und Krisen, die im Detail verborgen liegen und schließlich 
eine Aufforderung zum Handeln, um Erreichtes in dieser EU zu konsolidieren 
und die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben einer Lösung zuzuführen. 
 
München, im Februar 2008 
Helga Schubert 
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1. Europe in Crisis 
The integration of Europe is an unusual success story. It achieved the goal of 
securing peace and stability after a long succession of devastating wars; it 
overcame the disastrous schism between Eastern and Western Europe and made 
possible remarkable improvements in living standards. Still, since the surprising 
rejection of the Draft European Constitutional Treaty by the electorate in two of 
the EU's founding countries, France and the Netherlands, in the spring of 2005, a 
feeling of disorientation and despondency about the future of Europe has spread 
among Europeans. The enlargement of the EU by twelve new members has 
generated the fear that there will be no further progress towards an "ever closer 
Europe". 
However, the most recent agreement at the European summit in June 2007 gives 
grounds for hope that the long crisis will soon be over and that some institutional 
reforms will be possible in the near future. The conference in Lisbon on October 
18-19, 2007 approved the new Reform Treaty. Although this has been an 
unexpected success, especially for the German presidency, the sceptical views in 
some member states and of large parts of the public cannot be ignored. The new 
Reform Treaty has to be ratified by all 27 member states before the end of 2009, 
in time for the next elections of the European Parliament. An overall approval of 
the new EU treaty would be a small miracle. But a failure will throw the Union 
into a fundamental crisis. 
To some, Europe seems exhausted, suffering from overcharge and 
overextension. There are Eurosceptics who see the EU on the brink of decline. At 
best, they believe, Europe as an entity may survive only as a kind of loose 
European Commonwealth (Timothy Garton Ash 2005). But there is some 
evidence that the process of European integration is actually suffering from its 
very success. The crux of the matter is that politicians have refused to draw the 
institutional conclusions from an integration that has come a remarkably long 
way since its beginnings. This policy failure can be identified in the fact that the 
deepening and geographical widening of the EU has weakened the capacity of 
decision-making, as well as delayed structural policy reforms.  
Because "Brussels" and its bureaucracy often are used as a scapegoat for 
mistakes and failures committed by national governments, the idea of a unified 
Europe has suffered. To this day the European Union has failed to overcome its 
institutional weaknesses, its democratic deficits and its distance from its citizens. 
The heads of the EU states have not confronted the challenges of deepening and 
widening in time. Although the Reform Treaty might change the situation for the 
better, it remains an open question whether the treaty will be sufficient to solve 
the fundamental difficulties of the enlarged Union in a global world.  
The paradox of the current deep discomfort is that the EU can look back on 
unusual achievements since the mid 1990s, starting with the implementation of 
the Single European Market (1993) and continuing with European Monetary 
Union (1999) and finally with eastern and southeastern enlargement (2004 and 
2007). Apparently, the attraction of the EU has not been weakened, given the 
recent accession of Romania and Bulgaria and the new candidates (Croatia, 
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Turkey and others) waiting at Brussels’s door. In fact different integration zones 
emerged (see figure 1) and it is likely that the EU will differentiate further. With 
its 27 members, the EU today represents some 490 million people, contributes 
about 21 percent of the world’s output and - with its more than 20-percent share 
- sees itself as the largest trading power in the world. The EU may appear to be 
an economic giant, but it plays only a secondary role in the fields of international 
politics and institutions.  
The freezing of the process of integration at its current level is neither judicious 
nor is it wanted by the majority of EU citizens (see the Bertelsmann poll 2006). 
But the dangers of a gradual erosion of the current state of integration cannot be 
ignored. Only a united Europe can confront the challenges of globalization and 
economic modernization and achieve its role as a global player. What can be 
done both to protect the EU from falling apart and to usher in a new dynamic of 
integration? What kind of Europe do member states, and constituents of an 
enlarged union, want? 
2. Single European Market: An Uncompleted Pillar  
Since the Treaties of Rome (1958), the creation of a single European market 
without borders has been both the cornerstone and the driving force of 
integration. The initial goal - to create a common market for goods, services and 
production factors - was bogged down by the economic crises of the 1970s. With 
the expansion of the Treaties of Rome through the Single European Act (1987), it 
became possible to restart the internal-market project. The success of this 
sweeping liberalization effort was made possible by two innovations: the 
introduction of qualified majority decisions in the Council and the application of 
the basic principle of mutual recognition, based on minimum harmonization of 
rules, standards and norms. 
With the internal-market initiative, the removal of all barriers to the free 
exchange of goods, services, capital and labour, the member states intended to 
reduce costs and strengthen European-wide competitiveness and productivity. 
Through strong gains in efficiency and welfare, Europe was to become an 
economic power that could measure itself against the USA and the new 
competitors in Asia. Since the mid-1980s, the internal-market initiative has 
launched an astonishing integration dynamic. Broad areas of previously insulated 
commodity markets have been exposed to competition; external trade has picked 
up and intra-industrial specialization intensified. The economic benefits of a large 
single market are enormous.1 
However, the European single market is by no means complete. Instead of 
further strengthening this central pillar of the EU, numerous member states are 
actually attempting to undermine its functioning and to hinder transborder 
mergers and acquisitions (according to former EU Commission member Mario 
Monti, 2006). Another alarming sign is the increased number of treaty violations. 
Also unsatisfactory is the progress in the public procurement markets, where 
                                                 
1 The EU Commission estimated the cumulative welfare 'gains' of the enlarged internal 
market over the period 1992-2006 at 223 billion euros. The single European market 
increased the gross domestic product of the 25 EU countries by a total of 2.2 percentage 
points and created about 2.75 million new jobs (Ilzkovitz and others, tables 3-7).  
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there exist numerous national restrictions and a lack of transparency. In addition, 
the removal of barriers in other areas has proceeded much more slowly than 
expected. The "network industries" - transportation, energy and communication - 
are still subject to restrictive regulations and barriers, while the guidelines for 
liberalization of the gas and electricity markets have not been fully implemented. 
State aids and guarantees continue to deform transnational competition.  
The aid controls and competition policies of the European Commission 
increasingly run up against resistance. Both are among the EU's important areas 
of common responsibility, without which a single European market cannot 
function. Lately, so-called "national" interests dominate in many areas. However, 
an extensive purging (de-bureaucratization) of single-market regulations, which 
actually should have been carried out before the Eastern enlargement, still 
remains to be done.  
Increased efforts are necessary in order to exploit the growth- and employment 
potentials of a true internal European market.2 The greatest problems can be 
found in the realm of business services as well as in the dismantling of barriers to 
the mobility of workers and professionals. The Services Directive initially 
proposed by the Commission has been reworked and watered down because of 
objections by member countries and the European Parliament (fear of wage- and 
social dumping). The directive was intended to eliminate existing obstacles and 
regulations both to service providers’ freedom of movement within the EU and to 
the free exchange of services among member countries. There is the risk that the 
numerous derogations will achieve only an insufficient opening of the services 
markets, thus limiting the potential trade in services. 
The services sector in the EU makes up about 70 percent of the gross domestic 
product. But in most EU countries services are expensive, and possible 
production increases remain unrealized because of shielding from the outside 
market. Productivity increases and job creation within the euro region are 
noticeably lower than in the USA (and the United Kingdom and Sweden). A true 
liberalization of the European services market would induce appreciable 
improvements in efficiency and employment.3 There is no doubt that the welfare 
gains of the single European market are considerable. But the increased 
competitive pressure of a large single market also requires painful adjustments, 
which - just like the gains - are unequally distributed among the member coun-
tries and regions. From the outset it was evident that the accelerated adjustment 
process would necessitate accompanying economic-policy measures, in particular 
swifter domestic reforms. A functioning single market and monetary union 
require greater flexibility in both labour markets and wage-setting systems. While 
smaller member states such as Finland, Sweden and Denmark have undertaken 
courageous reforms in their labour markets and welfare systems, the larger 
member countries have been reluctant to start these inevitable reforms. 
The new member states made great efforts to adapt European policies and the 
shared body of legislation (acquis communautaire). They achieved astonishing, 
though varied, successes. However, in its 2005 progress report, the 
EBRD/Eastern Europe Bank (2005) noted a significant reduction in many 
                                                 
2 Ilzkovitz, Dierx, Kovacs, Sousa (2007), European Economy, European Paper No. 271, 
Brussels. 
3 For a survey of the debate and the welfare effects, see Vogt (2005). 
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southern European countries’ readiness for reform. The backlogs in the adoption 
of the extensive EU regulations are still considerable. The lowest deficits are 
exhibited by Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia (European Economy, Convergence 
report 2004a). Necessary adjustment measures, which should have improved the 
long-term functioning of the market economy and the competitiveness of the 
business sector in these countries, were often postponed. Since accession, 
progress has been achieved to varying degrees, but the latest Transition Report 
(2007) also mentions deficits in some countries and a slow pace of reforms. The 
full compliance with the acquis communautaire has not been reached by many 
countries. This is reflected by several infringement proceedings launched by the 
EU Commission at the Court of Justice of the EC.4 The increased competition 
within the large single market would presumably raise both the pressure for 
social adjustment and the unemployment in some accession states and as a 
result would also strengthen protectionist and defensive attitudes. 
 
FIGURE 1 Different integration zones of the extended EU and its neighbouring 
countries 
 
 
                                                 
4  Borissa, Lora (2007), Enforcement Actions under EU Law: The New Member States, 
European Institute for Public Administration, Working Paper 2007/W/01.  
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3. European Monetary Union: A Surprising Success 
The creation of the European Monetary Union (1999) proved to be a huge step 
forward in the integration process, whose effects go far beyond the shifting of 
important national sovereign rights to the European level. The EMU’s 
establishment was propelled both by propitious political circumstances and by the 
removal of barriers in the capital markets. The EMU embodies two innovations: 
On the one hand, there is the independence of the European Central Bank, which 
is responsible for the central monetary policies (though economic and fiscal 
policies - while also narrowed down by the stability pact and subject to a close 
coordination - will continue to be decided nationally). On the other hand, a 
differentiated integration approach is followed in the EMU, because only 13 
members are currently taking part in the monetary union. The EMU is a unique 
experiment, which is expressed not least in the great challenge of establishing a 
monetary union without a political union. The hope that the monetary union 
would serve as a vehicle of political integration - a hope cherished above all in 
Germany - seems now to be buried. 
The EMU has attempted to protect itself by two provisions. The first was to 
establish the price-stability goal (about two-percent inflation) as the main priority 
of the European Central Bank system. The second was to limit the dangers of 
diverging fiscal policies and excessive budget deficits with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). The latter sees to it that the national budget deficits do not 
exceed three percent of a country’s GDP and that in the medium term the 
national budgets are 'close to balanced'. Deviations from the budgetary policy 
guidelines can be punished by financial sanctions. The SGP should prevent 
member countries from irresponsible debt-spending without facing the 
disadvantages of higher interest rates. 
The institutional set-up of the European Central Bank, the exchange of national 
currencies for the euro as well as the first experiences of a single monetary policy 
have been effected astonishingly smoothly. In the previous seven years, the 
price-stability goal has been successfully achieved. The national rates of interest 
and price levels have converged rapidly, although recently the deviation of 
national inflation rates has again increased. Since 1999, the increase in price 
levels within the euro area has been a good two percent per year. However, 
budget discipline has suffered a loss in credibility, a development that could, 
among other things, threaten the long-term functioning of the EMU. After early 
successes in consolidating national budgets, especially during the pre-accession 
phases,    the budget deficits of Germany, Italy, France, Greece and Portugal 
have sometimes risen far beyond the three-percent limit. However, the recent 
economic upswing in the euro zone has led to a significant reduction of the 
budget deficits of the above-mentioned countries between 2005 and 2007. Their 
deficits now lie below the three-percent line.  
The fault for the overly high budget deficits lay in insufficient attempts to consoli-
date in advance, slow economic growth, delayed structural reforms (pension and 
health systems, labour markets, etc.) and finally the high costs of German 
reunification. It remains to be seen whether the recent reduction of budget 
deficits is sustainable. The stability pact has been softened noticeably, something 
that - given its political justification and the academic criticism of its lack of 
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flexibility - ought not to come as a surprise.5 Yet the reform of the stability pact 
has forced the EU members to concede to a stronger implementation of structural 
policies in pursuing monetary policy. The deficit bias of governments could better 
be dealt with by institutional constraints through constitutionally defined targets 
on a national level. The pact will remain a controversial issue, as will the question 
regarding the necessity, costs and efficiency of a coordinated fiscal policy within 
Europe. 
During its first seven years, European Monetary Union has proved to be a 
successful undertaking. The euro has become an astonishingly stable currency 
and has extended its role as an international currency. But the stable monetary 
course has not yet been able to improve Europe’s growth performance. The 
monetary policy course was pragmatic, even if the European Central Bank 
resisted a less restrictive monetary policy, fearing a loss of credibility. The tight 
monetary policy of Europe is threatened by a comparatively loose coordination of 
other economic policies, because of the lack of enforcement incentives. Similarly, 
the alternative of discretionary actions, for example through strong binding fiscal 
rules (as provided for in the stability pact), has not proved to be crisis-free. The 
question of whether the EMU will continue to act as integration-policy glue in the 
long term depends on a series of circumstances and factors. 
With the EMU, important monetary sovereignty was transferred from the national 
level to a supranational authority that executes a uniform "one-size-fits-all” 
monetary policy, which cannot take into account differing conditions and 
reactions in national economies. The member countries also lose an important 
economic-policy instrument: the possibility to offset different competitive 
conditions or shocks through exchange-rate corrections. The product and labour 
markets must now take over these tasks. Above all, a flexible and differentiated 
wage development will take on a greater role in regional and sectoral 
adjustments. The alternative would likely be higher and persistent unemployment 
and larger regional imbalances. Also here, up to now, the hope that the common 
monetary policy would encourage flexibility in the labour markets and lead to a 
convergence in important policy areas has proved deceptive. The economic-policy 
coordination practiced in the EU obviously has produced only marginal results. It 
remains an open question whether the new coordination cycle based on general 
broad economic-policy guidelines will have any effect on this. 
Although the new accession countries have agreed to eventually introduce the 
euro (no "opting out"), most of them are facing considerable problems in meeting 
the Maastricht criteria, especially because of higher inflation rates and budget 
deficits. Hungary, in particular, is exposed to heavy imbalances, including rising 
foreign debt and budget deficits (see figure 2). 
                                                 
5 Wyplosz, Charles (2006), European Monetary Union: The Dark Sides of a Major Success, 
in: European Policy, April 2006. 
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FIGURE 2: New EU Member Countries’ Compliance with Maastricht Criteria 
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Source: European Central Bank, ECB 2007. 
Nevertheless, Slovenia joined the euro network in 2007; most of the other 
accession countries have delayed the adoption of the euro. A premature linkage 
to the exchange rate and an overly restrictive budget policy would increase the 
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internal adjustment pressure and limit the growth margins during a phase of 
major structural changes. 
4. The Lisbon Strategy: Rhetoric or a New Policy Instrument? 
During the second half of the 1990s, Europe’s growth rate fell below that of the 
US (see figure 3), but per capita GDP in purchasing power standards (measuring 
the GDP by correcting price differentials) remained rather constant. Although the 
new EU member countries reached significant higher growth rates during the 
second half of the 1990s, the real convergence process has been rather slow 
(figure 4). At the Lisbon Summit Meeting in 2000, the EU, responding to 
increased global competition and the weak growth performance compared to the 
USA, set the ambitious goal of transforming the EU into "the most dynamic, 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010", thus inducing higher growth, 
more and better jobs and greater cohesion. The Lisbon Agenda's6 diverse goals 
are to be achieved with the help of a new kind of economic-policy instrument, the 
loose, minimally binding method of open coordination, which gives national 
governments a lot of leeway. This new instrument is based mainly on the 
establishment of common economic-policy guidelines, on national action plans for 
implementing those guidelines, on the formulation of national capacity indicators 
and "best-practice" comparisons, as well as on regular reports and monitoring by 
the Commission.  
The results thus far have been disappointing (Pisany-Ferry 2005). The Kok 
Report of November 2004 determined two basic reasons for this: an overly broad 
agenda with contradictory priorities on the one hand, and insufficient 
implementation of reforms in the member states on the other. What is also 
evident, however, is that the strategy of "open coordination" offers insufficient 
incentives to achieve the best solutions in keeping with the "benchmarking 
approach". The EU thus is threatened with the likelihood of failing to achieve its 
stipulated goals, despite a stricter application of the Lisbon strategy. Moreover, 
the numerous signs of lagging behind in the old EU countries cannot be over-
looked. Already as early as the mid 1990s, productivity growth in the EU 
remained well behind that of the USA. From 2001 to 2005, annual real GDP 
growth in Germany, France and Italy averaged one percent, well below the 
average of the other EU countries (2.3 percent) and the USA (2.6 percent). In all 
sectors the US performed better than the EU (Table 1), but a growth accounting 
analysis showed that the productivity differences could be explained mostly (to 
75 percent) by the better performance of the private service sector in the US.7  
                                                 
6 The completion of the single market and the integrated financial market, the creation of an 
information society and coordinated networks for R&D, the dismantling of burdensome 
regulations, social cohesion and sustainable development. 
7 European Commission (2007), DG Ecfin: The EU economy: 2007 review, Moving Europe’s 
productivity frontier, Brussels, p. 48.  
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FIGURE 3: GDP growth in the EU-15 and the US (constant prices 2000; annual 
percentage changes) 
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Source: European Commission (2007a), DG Ecfin, European Economy, Statistical 
Annex, Autumn 2007, p. 49.  
 
FIGURE 4: Per capita GDP at current market prices per head of the population in PPS: 
Purchasing Power Standards (EU=100) 
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Source: European Commission (2007a), DG Ecfin, European Economy, Statistical 
Annex, Autumn 2007, pp. 47-48.  
 
Because of the failure to implement structural reforms and because of insufficient 
growth, among other things, unemployment in the EU-15 has risen to about 
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eight percent. The recent cyclical recovery and employment improvements since 
2006 are promising,8 but a sustainable increase of the growth potential (currently 
estimated at two percent) is not yet guaranteed in face of the large financial 
burdens due to demographic and other problems in most EU countries.9 
TABLE 1: GDP, labour input in hours and labour productivity per hour (annual average 
volume growth rates in percent) EU-10 (EU-15 minus Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden) and the United States 
 GDP Labour input in hours Labour productivity in 
hours 
Total Industries 
 1981-95 96-2000 2001-04 1981-95 96-2000 2001-04 1981-95 96-2000 2001-04
EU10 2.0 2.6 1.4 -0.2 1.0 0,4 2.2 1.5 1.0 
US 2.8 4.1 2.1 1.4 2.0 -0.4 1.3 2.1 2.6 
Manufacturing 
EU10 1.5 2.0 0.3 -2.1 -0.3 -1.9 3.5 2.3 2.2 
US 3.0 4.9 0.8 -0.3 0.4 -5.0 3.3 4.4 5.7 
Private Services 
EU10 2.8 3.3 1.9 0.7 1.9 1.1 2.1 1.4 0.9 
US 3.2 5.1 2.6 2.1 2.8 -0.4 1.2 2.2 3.0 
Rest of the Economy 
EU10 1.0 1.5 1.3 -0.2 0.5 0.7 1.2 1.0 0.5 
US 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.4 0.3 0.0 0.6 
Source: European Commission, DG Ecfin: The EU economy, 2007 review, Moving 
Europe’s productivity frontier, Brussels, 2007, p. 48. 
Although the various indicators of competitiveness and the hard facts yield 
different results, they reveal that the average of EU economies performed worse 
than the US economy but also fell behind that of the other OECD countries. But 
there are considerable differences in performance among the individual EU 
member countries. At the top are Finland, Sweden and Denmark, while Italy and 
Greece remain at the bottom of the performance ranking. There are also 
tremendous differences among the Central European countries, which could 
                                                 
8 Real GDP growth of the EU-27 during 2006-2008 is expected to be around 2.9 percent per 
year. In addition, Germany has lost its role as growth laggard.  
9 European Commission (2006), The impact of ageing on public expenditure, in: European 
Economy, Special Report No. 1/2006.  
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benefit from a successful Lisbon Strategy because an enhanced technological and 
educational policy would improve their growth and employment perspectives.10 
There are many explanations for the weakness of European economies, most of 
them related to the failure to implement essential domestic structural reforms. 
The dynamics of reforms - or the absence of reforms - depends to a great extent 
on domestic political constellations and elections in individual countries. 
Competitive pressure both from within and outside the European Union has only 
moderate effects and increasingly tends to run up against protectionist 
tendencies. Up to now, it has scarcely been possible to implement an economic 
policy anchored to the European level or an efficient coordination of national 
economic policies, despite the fact that - at least within the euro zone - it is more 
urgent than ever. 
5. Agricultural and Regional Policies: Major Needs for Reform  
The central areas of European unity - the single market and monetary union - are 
flanked by common EU policies, especially the agricultural and structural policies, 
which receive the majority of the EU budget expenditure. The question as to 
whether the financial measures are used efficiently has always been a matter of 
controversy. Although a common agricultural market is among the central issues 
of common policy and is a part of the single market, the European agricultural 
policy (CAP) was aimed at supporting farmers’ incomes. Yet the price supports 
created production incentives, which resulted in the notorious lakes of milk and 
mountains of cattle. In order to prevent a price explosion, one even resorted to 
planned-economy instruments (sugar and milk quotas), without substantially 
lowering the costs of agricultural policy. More than 40 percent of the EU budget 
still flows into the agricultural sector, although its share is declining over the 
financial period 2007-2013 (see Table 2). 
Only very slowly is the existing system opening up. Beginning with the McSharry 
Reform (1992),11 the EU gradually lowered agricultural prices. Step by step, it 
guided at least some of them (for example, grain prices) to world market level. 
Government leaders continued the trend with the Agenda 2000 (Berlin 1999). Yet 
the price reductions are compensated for through direct income assistance. A 
cost savings could therefore not be reached, especially since money was also 
pumped into agriculture via the "second pillar" (rural development). An important 
breakthrough was reached in 2003, because the income transfers were no longer 
strictly tied to the means of production (land and number of animals) but were 
paid as lump-sum operation premiums (based on an average of the previous 
years). In addition, the payment of premiums would be linked to the fulfilment of 
legally prescribed injunctions related to the protection of the environment, of 
animals and jobs, whereby simultaneously the entire agricultural budget would 
be frozen. The isolation and limiting of expenses make the agricultural policy 
more efficient. It is also hoped that these measures will control the costs of EU 
enlargement.  
                                                 
10  World Economic Forum (2007), The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, Geneva. 
11 The agricultural reform started under the Irishman Ray MacSharry (EU agricultural 
commissioner from 1989 to 1992). 
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In November 2007 the European Commission presented new reform proposals 
anticipating the mid-term review of EU policies in 2008. The new CAP concept 
aims at limiting subsidies to larger farms, which are profiting the most under the 
existing system. Especially Germany is opposing the new proposals because it 
fears there will be fewer subsidies for the large eastern German farms. As 
compensation, the second pillar of the CAP (rural development) should be further 
extended.  
TABLE 2: Financial framework of the EU 2007-2013 (share of expenditures 
related to different policy areas) 
 2007 2013 2007-2013 
Regional and Cohesion Policy 
42.5 45.9 44.2 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 45.6 40.2 43.0 
Internal Affairs (Security and Jus-
tice) 
1.0 1.6 1.2 
External Affairs 5.1 6.3 5.7 
Rest (i. e., Administration) 5.8 6.0 5.9 
Source: European Commission, DG Budget, 2007. 
The EU policy area’s second pillar is its regional and cohesion policy. European 
unification may be based on the fundamental condition that it increases the 
prosperity of everybody and leads to economic convergence among and within 
the member countries. Nevertheless, empirical experiences qualify this 
assumption. At the national level, successful examples such as Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal contrast with disappointments such as Greece. Therefore, the EU 
supports the economic and social convergence with the help of the structural and 
cohesion policy. Yet the latter should not only reduce differences in income 
through transfer payments but should also obtain the prerequisites for a self-sup-
porting development process in the regions. The economic argument is that 
certain deficits (infrastructure, education, etc.) have to be reduced or eliminated 
in order to allow the less-developed regions to profit from the more intense 
competition in the single market. 
Criticism of the regional and cohesion policy has been around as long as the 
policy itself, and has been fed by its poor results. Although the EU Commission 
regularly points to successes12 (European Commission 2004b), there is still less 
economic convergence among the EU regions than among the states. Scholarly 
investigations have called into question the effectiveness of regional policy.13 
Bureaucracy and centralism, incorrect allocation and political influence on 
                                                 
12 European Commission, DG Regio (2004b), A New Partnership for Cohesion, Third Report 
on Economic and Social Cohesion, Brussels, February 2004. 
13 Boldrin, Michele and Fabio Canova (2001), Inequality and convergence in Europe’s regions: 
reconsidering European regional policies, in: Economic Policy 32, April 2001.  
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methods of allotment, lack of transparency and overlapping of various programs, 
corruption and political bargaining: these are additional catchwords of the critical 
discussion. The critics’ demands range from complete abandonment of the 
regional funds to partial changes (mainly objective-1 assistance). 
The reform debate intensified with the Eastern enlargement in 2004, because the 
regional policy was formulated originally for countries with limited regional and 
income differences. With Eastern enlargement, however, the national and 
regional economic disparities increased dramatically. The only slightly modified 
regional and cohesion policy (three instead of five assistance objectives, 
streamlining of procedures, improved financial controls, etc.) will be insufficient 
to meet these new challenges.  
By decreasing outlays/expenditures to the old EU member states (which, 
however, continue to receive considerable funds), the entire EU outlays for the 
next financial period (2007-2013) could be lowered by about one percent of GNP 
relative to their economic power, to a total of approximately 864 billion euros (in 
2004 prices). They are modest compared to the national budgets, amounting to 
about 270 euros per person per year. The problem, however, lies more in the 
structure of the outlays than in their amount. Approximately 80 percent is used 
for the agricultural and regional policy - in other words, for policy areas whose 
effectiveness has been called into question (see table 2). In addition, it is 
questionable whether the European level should be responsible in this sphere. 
Other policy areas that could be more important for the continued development 
and the future growth potential of the Union (foreign and security policy, 
innovation policy, education) are also neglected in the new financial period. A 
wide-ranging reform of the EU budgetary system and EU policies is still on the 
agenda, especially if the EU wants to accept more members. 
6. Rules versus Coordination and Systems Competition 
In order to function properly, the EU requires institutions. In a complex, multi-
level system, it must be determined which duties should be decided on a central 
(supranational) or a national level, as well as which rules (voting, for example) 
should be applied to form compromises and to define new scopes of action. Since 
the beginning of European unification, tensions between the "supranational" and 
the "intergovernmental" methods have accompanied the EU’s integration path. At 
the centre of the integration strategy is the "Community method", based on the 
combined efforts of the commission’s initiative monopoly (in other words, the 
exclusive right to initiate proposals), the decisions of the council and the 
monitoring function of the European Parliament. However, this innovative 
framework has been watered down and made less efficient by the large number 
of ill-defined tasks, overlapping competencies and increasing possibilities of 
minority blockades (in the majority decision making). With each enlargement 
round, the member states’ blockade possibilities have increased. The ensuing 
advance of intergovernmental cooperation has eroded the community method, 
thus threatening one of the central achievements of European integration. 
One main driving force of European market integration was the effort to remove 
all manner of economic barriers (non-discrimination). This began with trade 
liberalization and continued with the internal-market concept, which has been 
described as one of the largest deregulation operations in history. Originally, the 
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harmonizing concept - the perfectionist approximation of laws - was in the 
forefront of attempts to bring about a convergence of basic economic conditions 
and policies. Very soon, however, this concept was caught in a thicket of national 
interests and protection requirements. The harmonizing idea finally was replaced 
by a new approach involving mutual recognition of norms, regulations and 
admission procedures, an approach that the European Court of Justice already 
had defined in 1979.14 With it, the breakthrough was achieved for a competitive 
regulation system, encouraging a more long-term convergence of rules involved 
in single-market policies. Yet at the same time, the pressure of competition 
created by open markets and the removal of barriers (especially for capital 
movements) will give rise to a sharper systems competition. 
Can the systems competition, together with the principle of "subsidiarity,"15 
become a structural principle for Europe? It appears as if the system competition 
among the countries could replace centralizing decisions and central institutions, 
also eliminating some fears about the European superstate (and its regulatory 
addiction). Theoretical analyses16  and early experiences in the new world of 
globalization indicate, however, that significant disadvantages emerge as well. It 
is to be feared that competitive pressures could also lead to an erosion of the 
social achievements, of environmental standards and of consumer protection in 
the welfare states. Another danger is an erosion of tax revenues, and thus of 
infrastructure facilities, because of the migration of capital away from high-tax 
countries. 
                                                 
14 "If a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one member state, it may be sold 
everywhere in the community" (Cassis-de-Dijon).  
15 According to the subsidiarity principle (Maastricht Treaty 1993), in the areas that do not 
fall under its jurisdiction, the EU should only involve itself "as long as the goals of the 
measures under consideration cannot adequately be reached on the level of the member 
states ... and because of their scope or their effects can better be reached on the 
community level". 
16  Sinn, Hans-Werner (2003), The New Systems Competition, Yrjö Jahnsson Lectures, Helsinki 
1999, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
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FIGURE 5: Different levels of taxation (in percentage of the GDP) in various groups 
of EU member countries 
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Source: European Commission, DG Ecfin 2006. 
Within the EU, the risks of a "race to the bottom" due to competitive pressures in 
areas of environmental and consumer protection have been met by minimum 
rules. In the social and tax area, both the European and national policies are 
challenged, while in the areas involving taxation of capital incomes and bank 
regulations, minimum harmonization and international voting procedures are 
becoming ever more urgent. Meanwhile, a broad-based tax harmonization, 
especially in the business sector, runs up against the opposition of many older 
and newer member states and - whether it is sensible or not - becomes almost 
impossible to carry through, at least in the medium term. For some countries 
(Ireland, Slovakia), low tax rates are an important instrument to improve the 
investment climate, especially for foreign companies. In the meantime, the old 
member countries, especially the net payers with high social standards, fear that 
the EU transfers would be used for a low company tax rate in the new accession 
countries and would thus favour the migration of jobs as well as the erosion of 
the old member countries’ tax base. Here, too, clear conflicts of interests are 
evident, arising from a growing heterogeneity of the European economic sphere 
and standing in the way of a convergence on the European level (see figure 5 for 
different taxation levels). 
These difficulties are even greater in the area of social policy, which (aside from 
minimum rules related to job and health security, etc.) has remained almost 
exclusively within the competence of the member states. Moreover, there is 
increasing pressure to reform the social models of rich European industrial 
nations because of internal developments (high unemployment rates, aging 
populations) as well as external challenges (globalization, Eastern enlargement). 
The new member countries face equally dramatic reforms, because of the need 
to replace the complete social protection in communism with systems financed by 
contributions or taxes. With increased migration, immigration countries could try 
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to reduce the attractiveness of their welfare-state contributions by raising new 
barriers, which would not only run counter to the requirements of the single 
market but also would be counterproductive, because it rejects the advantages of 
labour migrations. The other possibility would be to admit immigrants from 
Eastern Europe only slowly and partially into the social system of individual 
member countries. The idea of swiftly bringing the social standards of accession 
countries to the level of the rich member countries is also counterproductive, 
because it would have serious negative effects on growth and employment in the 
accession countries (see, for example, the social union in the new German 
Länder after unification). 
So far, the social-political regulations on the European level have had pacifying 
effects, although, time and again, the painful results of market fusion have 
encouraged demands for a European social model. It is evident that, in the long 
run, the majority of the European population can hardly support a Europe that is 
deeply split on the social level. But under the present circumstances neither the 
need for a centralized social and employment policy nor for policies involving 
massive redistributions can be justified on the EU level. The differences in the 
social systems and concepts of social order in the member states are still much 
too great, and there is no broad willingness among the rich member states to pay 
for extensive financial compensations. In addition, there are considerable 
dangers that a European-level social (and transfer) policy would have to accept 
responsibility for the mistakes and omissions of national economic and social 
policies and that the pace of convergence would be slowed. Conformity of social 
systems is only possible in the long run, and over the course of economic 
convergence. In the meantime, the learning process of the Lisbon Strategy and 
the adoption of "best practice" models must be in the forefront. 
7. Institutional Reforms after the Rejection of the European 
Constitution  
Little by little, in a dialectic process involving crises and piecemeal reforms, the 
European Union has continued to develop. However, in the 1990s European 
politicians missed their chance to turn the European house into a crisis-free 
structure and - in time for the EU’s enlargement - to firmly establish the 
necessary decision-making procedures for an effective Union. There are many 
causes for the standstill in deepening the EU and for the existing public distrust. 
One is the lack of transparency and the growing complexity of European 
decisions. Another can be found in an increased heterogeneity resulting from 
successive enlargements. Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries joined the 
European Union for largely economic reasons. Fear of political pressures caused 
by a monetary union and of progressive losses in sovereignty prevented these 
countries (with the exception of Finland) from introducing the euro. Thus, 
suggestions for expanding majority decisions in the council or for transferring 
more sovereignty to common institutions regularly have met with stubborn 
opposition. 
Hence it is not surprising that institutional and political integration have 
proceeded much more slowly than economic integration. Admittedly, the 
European Parliament gradually has taken on important competencies, but as a 
European institution it is still far from playing a central and visible role in 
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European politics. Although direct European elections have taken place since 
1979, the dramatically diminishing voter participation in recent elections shows 
that the “Europe orientation” is poorly anchored in the media and population. In 
June 2004, the European Parliament was re-elected with a voter participation of 
only 44 percent (in Poland: 20 percent). 
Attempts at institutional reforms over the last ten years had disappointing 
results. Neither the treaty of Amsterdam (1997) nor Nice (2001) improved the 
Union’s capability to act effectively. The treaty of Nice actually in force must be 
seen as a step backwards, since it gave Spain and Poland voting weights in 
majority decisions of the council that stand in flagrant contrast to their share of 
the population. In the drafting of a European constitution, an attempt was made 
to overturn these imbalances using the "double majority" principle (a majority of 
the member states that make up at least three-fifths of the population), whereby 
the principles of a union of citizens and states are given equal weight. 
After the debacle of the European Council at Nice, the constitutional convention 
took on a new and unconventional approach to make the EU more efficient, 
transparent and democratic. In the summer of 2003, the "Convention on the 
Future of Europe" presented a draft agreement on a European constitution. One 
certainly could disagree about the qualities of this draft agreement (a monster, 
with 465 articles, five protocols and three declarations). Yet numbers of 
important improvements are connected to it, including an enhanced ability to 
take actions, a simplification of the decision-making procedures, expanded 
powers of the EU Parliament, establishment of an EU foreign minister and inclu-
sion of all treaties in one document. The draft agreement was formally signed by 
the state and government leaders of all 25 member states in 2004. Eighteen 
member states have ratified the draft treaty fully.  
At the Brussels summit in June 2007, the guidelines of the new revised EU treaty 
- called the Reform Treaty (RT) - were accepted, which amounted to a great 
success for the German presidency.  The RT, which preserves much of the 
substance of the draft constitution rejected by French and Dutch voters two years 
ago, was finally accepted at the Lisbon summit in October 2007. However, the 
delay in voting procedures (up to 2014/17) and the exceptions for some member 
states are signs of rising national egotism and of large rifts among member 
states. The new treaty will improve the EU’s decision-making ability (double 
majority, expansion of majority decisions, etc.), but a wide and public debate 
about the transparency of policymaking and about the ultimate goals, 
instruments and limits of the EU has not yet taken place. At the same time, some 
risks still exist because the RT has to be ratified by all member countries in 2008 
in order to be in force before the European Parliament elections in 2009. 
However, all member states intend to avoid a further referendum, which 
increases the chances of its success. 
8. European Perspectives in a Consolidation Phase 
The 27 EU states cannot be governed on the basis of rules and regulations 
originally conceived for six member states only. Thus the European unification 
project remains prone to crisis and its outcome uncertain. In the last 15 years, 
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the EU governments shrank from realizing courageous reforms,17 because they 
refused to recognize the dimensions of the problems and they feared domestic 
political consequences. Thus they put short-sighted "national" interests ahead of 
everything else. At the Copenhagen Summit (1993), there was still a consensus 
that Eastern enlargement should not be allowed to affect "the momentum of 
European integration". With the Eastern enlargement in 2004, the principle that 
enlargement must be accompanied by a deepening of the integration process was 
violated for the first time. 
Nevertheless, one should recognize that the 50-year development of the 
European Economic Community to the European Union, from the customs union 
to the economic and monetary union, was successful, although stimulated by 
doubtful compromises and financial concessions. But the increase in 
competencies and the numerous enlargements led simultaneously to an 
increasing complexity and bewildering variety of overlapping decision-making and 
governmental levels, as well as to unclear competency assignments and 
procedures.18  
Today the EU suffers from a growing ungovernability and lack of transparency, 
which can scarcely be overcome by the "open coordination" of economic, 
industrial, labour and social policies. Given a multi-level system (cooperation 
among regions, national states and supranational structures) with constantly 
changing coalitions, it remains uncertain if simple and transparent relationships 
can develop between member states and EU institutions. The governance of the 
EU, as well as the efficiency in coordinating economic decisions, thus might 
worsen in an enlarged union based on the Nice Treaty currently in force. In 
addition, in a union with 27 members, the complex tangle of council meetings, 
working groups, committees and national governments likely would become 
procedurally ever more problematic, and attempts to balance interests 
increasingly time-consuming.19 
Ultimately, to avoid a dangerous erosion of the integration level already 
achieved, the solution to this deadlocked situation remains a model of 
differentiated developments, in which member states that are willing to advance 
do so, while the hesitant members follow along later. This solution, however, 
which would involve the "enhanced cooperation" of a centre of gravity, would at 
first only be realizable in a few areas. The previous integration motor - the team 
of France and Germany - has obviously become much weaker. Intergovernmental 
cooperation both within and without the Union could help a core (pilot) European 
group to promote flexible advances in, for example, foreign and security policies 
as well as in justice and home affairs.20 However, any progressive solutions 
                                                 
17 The various stations of this evasion are Berlin 1999, Agenda 2000, Nice 2002 and Brussels 
2003. 
18 Sapir, André et al. (2004), An Agenda for a Growing Europe, Oxford University Press. 
Wood, Steve and Wolfgang Quaisser (2008), The New European Union, Confronting the 
Challenges of Integration, Boulder Colorado, London.  
19 The future 23 official languages (including Maltese) are likely not only to burden the 
functioning of the EU organs but also to develop into a financial scandal. Today the EU 
spends a billion euros for the language service and 500 million for translations.  
20 Regular polls of the European public show an astonishingly positive and strong 
endorsement of a common security and defence policy (EU-25: 77 percent) as well as a 
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would be offset by the risks of a fragmentation of powers and the emergence of 
new frictions with the fringe group. Certainly, the political credibility and 
legitimacy of the European Union, as well as its foreign-policy effectiveness, 
would suffer. It would be fatal if the member states accepted the gradual 
spreading of intergovernmental cooperation forms and thus tolerated the EU’s 
drifting into an imperfect internal European market with rudimentary forms of 
common policies. 
During a consolidation phase, the first priorities would lie in the completion of the 
single market (especially the services and financial market) and in a gradual 
reorganization of the agricultural and structural policies. Common assistance 
policies should strengthen European cohesion and solidarity instead of opening 
new schisms with disputes about allocations. Through compulsory procedures 
and inducements, the coordination of economic policies and the dovetailing of 
monetary policy with fiscal policy in the euro area ought to improve, and the 
credibility of the stability pact be won back. The council should increase the 
transparency of its decision-making and expand the scope of majority decisions. 
Using its controlling and co-determination rights, the European Parliament ought 
to increase its visibility to the European citizens and thus help dismantle the 
democratic deficit. 
The role of the European Commission as a trustworthy moderator and "Guardian 
of the Treaties" is indispensable, its authority and the efficiency of its agencies 
vital in order to advance the integration dynamics and avert undesirable 
developments. During a longer consolidation phase, one could clear up the 
question of common actions and policies and increase the efficiency of decision-
making. It even should be possible to simplify the complex interconnections 
between EU organs and member countries, and to concentrate on core tasks of 
the EU (single European market, competition, external trade, monetary, security 
and defense policy) and bring secondary functions back to the national and 
decentralised level. 
The member states should make it a priority to carry out domestic reforms and 
finally to pursue resolutely the consolidation of national finances. In this way, the 
swift completion of the single market could become the central element in a 
growth- and innovation-enhancing policy. Strong and sustainable growth would 
not only encourage the essential reforms in the member states and their tangible 
convergence but also would support the process of European integration. 
A consolidation phase would also be helpful for the new accession countries. The 
tasks of getting used to the EU’s complex rules, practicing procedures of finding 
compromises within European institutions, carrying out the single market rules 
and preparing to join the monetary union are difficult enough and will absorb all 
the countries’ energies in the next few years. Only after this phase could the 
Union devote itself to new expansions, although this in no way rules out 
institutional rapprochements (Extended European Economic Area, in particular 
Extended Associate Membership, the right to speak out on political questions as 
well as financial and technical assistance for privileged partners). 
The EU faces extraordinary internal and external challenges, which can no longer 
be met on a national level. These challenges derive not only from the difficult 
                                                                                                                                                        
common foreign policy (EU-25: 68 percent) (Eurobarometer, December 2005 and 
Bertelsmann poll 2006). 
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tasks of the current and future enlargement but also from the pressures of 
globalisation and the worldwide problems of combating poverty, epidemics, 
criminality and terrorism, and in the attempt to limit the smuggling of weapons 
and spread of weapons of mass destruction. To meet these challenges, Europe 
requires capable, stable and efficient institutions and decision-making 
procedures. In the context of political and economic-policy cooperation, only a 
united Europe can speak with one voice and act as important player in interna-
tional affairs. National politicians should strengthen the credibility of European 
political actions instead of defending national positions or launching into 
European soapbox speeches. Only then will citizens take the big European project 
seriously again and be more willing to accept the necessary changes. 
Europe cannot afford an extended standstill or - even worse - a failure of 
European integration. The political and economic costs of disintegration would be 
unimaginably high. If the European member states wish to secure their welfare 
as well as political and social stability, they must remember that only together 
can they accomplish their future in an ever-closer Europe.  
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